

FROM PARTNER TO ALLY – ROMANIA’S INTEREST AND WAR ON TERRORISM

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

FROM PARTNER TO ALLY - ROMANIA'S INTEREST AND WAR ON TERRORISM

by

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ABSTRACT

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Romania as a country placed at the junction of four areas: Central Europe, Southeast Europe, Eastern Europe and the Black Sea - Caucasus – Central Asia, has its strategic national security directly influenced by its geographical location. The important transformation in Romania's status that occurred with its NATO and European Union membership suggests a reevaluation of Romania's national interest and its security strategy.

Romania's regional policy is based upon its strategic capability offered by access to the Danube River and Black Sea, but the protection of its regional interests has to be based on strong relations with the United States. Romanian interest in the region will be protected if the Strategic Partnership with the United States is developed. To realize this goal, Romania's option is to continue to be an active participant in the Global War on Terrorism.

This paper analyzes Romania's and the United States' interest in the Black Sea – Caucasus region, who are the actors in the region, and what has Romania to do to protect its interests. It further analyzes how Romania can be, to the United States, a committed partner and friend in the Global War on Terrorism.

FROM PARTNER TO ALLY – ROMANIA'S INTEREST AND GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

Romania as a country placed at the junction of four areas: Central Europe, Southeast Europe, Eastern Europe and the Black Sea - Caucasus – Central Asia region, has its strategic national security directly influenced by its geographical location. As a NATO and European Union member its national defense and security is based on its national interests, on its own policy, and on the alliance system.

Romania's regional policy is based upon its strategic capability offered by access to the Danube River and Black Sea, but the protection of its regional interests has to be based on strong relations with two big players in the Black Sea – Caucasus area: the European Union, as member of this union, and with its special partner and ally the United States. Based upon its economic and military status, since 1998 Romania developed a Strategic Partnership with the United States in order to be supported in its NATO accession. Now this new status of NATO and European Union membership suggests a need for reevaluation of Romania's national interest and its security strategy.

Romanian Policy after September 11, 2001

September 11th, 2001 represents a turning point in world history. All people, countries, and their leaders understood that the future would be changed. It was what James A. Dewar calls “a wild card”¹ scenario: the unimagined action with amazing effect.

The year 2001 was the beginning of a global transformation. NATO, a *de jure* alliance, was improved with *de facto* new allies. The majority of democratic countries

joined the United States and was ready to follow it in the war against a new enemy - global terrorism. This was the way that Romania followed in 2001, the way that made it a *de facto* NATO member. It was the only way that assured the opportunity to accomplish its own national interests.

This analysis will include the historical special events in which Romania has been involved: Balkan crises, and the expansion of NATO, and the European Union. However to clarify Romanian's evolution, the decisive point of reference will be the year 2001.

As the result of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 Romania expressed its full support with the North Atlantic Council decision on October 4th on the implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This decision had a long history because Romania, after 1990, developed a pro-Western policy and the relationship with the United States was its foundation. The central piece in this pro-Western orientation was the United States - Romania Strategic Partnership. Launched in 1997 on the occasion of President William Clinton's visit to Romania, the Partnership provided a political framework for catalyzing the bilateral cooperation in four major areas: military reform, economic relations, security issues and law enforcement².

Romania chose a special relationship with the United States because it wanted to become a NATO member, and it saw that this relationship with the United States was the best way to achieve it. After the NATO Summit at Madrid, in 1997, when Romania was not accepted into the alliance, President Clinton affirmed:

...the door to NATO is open. It will stay open. ... The United States and Romania would establish a strategic partnership to serve as a model in the region of cooperation for freedom and peace³.

Romania lost the battle in 1997 but did not lose the war. The special partnership with the United States created a motivation among the people for the transformation of

the country. At the same time Romania's relation with the European Union and the World Bank changed. Romania received around \$ 500 million in 1999 from World Bank and received the EU's agreement for \$ 600 million annually through 2006. This financial aid was absolutely necessary for Romania's infrastructure development and to cover a part of its economic sacrifice for its implementation of the United Nations' embargo on Serbia.

NATO's decision to strike Serbian territory in 1999 was agreed upon by the Romanian leadership. The decision, to permit access to NATO's aircraft in Romanian air space was made not only by the governing coalition, but its parliamentary opposition as well. It was not an easy decision. In Parliament, former President Ion Iliescu and his Social Democrat Party abstained from voting in support of Romania's participation in NATO's operations. Iliescu's opinion was that the integration process is cumulative and it does not depend upon specific events.⁴

But in October 2001, after becoming president of Romania, Iliescu's views changed. Romania approved American aircraft to utilize its airspace for bombing Afghanistan. Indeed it was not the only action which Romania undertook. In 2002, Romania increased its military effort and sent troops for NATO's KFOR mission and deployed an infantry battalion in Kandahar Afghanistan, during Operation Enduring Freedom.

These military dimensions were developed alongside political and economic actions. Romania was cognizant that its economic progress had not been successful, but it made strident political efforts to maintain the same level of financial aid from the United States. In 2002, the European Union allocated more than \$ 250 millions to help

Bucharest to meet accession requirements....In October 2002, the World Bank announced that it would grant Bucharest approximately \$ 1 billion between 2002 and 2004 for a variety of social and infrastructure projects, and six day later the International Monetary Fund approved a \$ 380 million standby loan⁵.

Politically, Romania increased its diplomatic effort in relation with the United States and European countries' governments. Romania's main concern was Russia and its opposition against Western influence's extension across the Black Sea area. Russia's economy was weak, but its diplomatic and military power remained strong enough to threaten Romania's interests. The problem was solved in July 2003, when Russia signed a peace treaty with Romania.

But this treaty did not make Romania safe. To be more certain of American support, Romanian minister of foreign affairs Mircea Geoana, a former Romanian ambassador in Washington, facilitated Romania's President and Prime Minister's visits to America to lobby Congress and the Bush Administration. Romania could not offer military or economic power to assist the United States, but could offer military facilities like the Black Sea harbor in Constanta and airport facilities in Kogalniceanu. This was a way for Romania to articulate its security interest with those of America's military interests.

Romania needed more economic support, and this came, essentially, from the United States. The United States share of Romania's total trade flows was 4.3 percent for exports and 3 percent for imports. By December 31, 2002, a total of 3,512 American companies were registered in Romania.

In Europe, Romania began to play an important role in regional organizations, such as the Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative and the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, and has been a positive force in supporting stability and cooperation in the area.

On February 12, 2003, Romania, through Parliamentary vote, chose to join the Coalition of the willing, and send around 800 troops to Iraq. These troops included one infantry battalion, one military police company, as well as medical, intelligence, and staff officers. It was another gesture that demonstrated that Romania was a dependable ally. This troop deployment was made to confirm political commitment in the fight against terrorism and to present Romania's dedication to Western values.

At this time America's economic support was strongly tied with its political support of Romania. On November 23, 2003 President Bush visited Romania, and in Bucharest's Revolution Square, Bush said:

... We welcome Romania into NATO... Should any danger threaten Romania, should any nation threaten Romania, the United States of America and NATO will be by your side⁶.

It was what Romania wanted to hear: that beside them are the United States, and NATO, not Russia. This was the nicest Romanian dream and in that year it became reality.

On March, 29, 2004, Romania was officially recognized as a NATO member and the Romanian people knew that many things would be changed in their country. Romania had decided and its desire was approved...the communist past was far away. The new election would prove that. Romanians elected a new president and a new coalition of governance which would increase political, diplomatic, military, and

economic effort to integrate into NATO and to create conditions for an invitation to join the European Union.

The approval in April 2005 of the Accession Treaty to join the European Union was a positive signal for Romania, confirming its progress towards accession until this stage.

At the same time, in 2005, Romania signed the agreement with the United States that established an American troop presence in Romania. It was one of the best decisions made by Romania and it influenced the future of the political relations between Romania and the United States.

In January, 2007, Romania was accepted as a member of the European Union and assumed all the obligations that arise from this status.

This important transformation in Romania's status that occurred with its NATO and European Union membership suggests a need for reevaluation of Romania's national interest and its security strategy.

Romania's Regional Interests and Its Relation with Regional Actors

Romania's interests are stipulated in Romania's National Security Strategy, signed by President Traian Basescu in 2007, and include: real integration into the European Union; assuming responsibility as a NATO member; maintaining the state's unity, integrity, sovereignty, and independence; developing a dynamic, competitive market economy; the education system's modernization; development of human, scientific and technological capabilities; health and welfare development and, protection of national culture, identity and spiritual life in European framework⁷.

Romania's national security is directly influenced by its geographical location at the junction of four areas: Central Europe, Southeast Europe, Eastern Europe and the

Black Sea-Caucasus-Central Asia region, extending into the Mediterranean and Middle East. This geo-strategic positioning represents an advantage for Romania in promoting a stabilization and engagement policy for these areas, by developing intra and inter-regional cooperation in direct connection with international organizations (NATO, European Union, UN, OSCE), and in order to counteract threats to continental and global security.

To promote its interest, Romania does not consider the Black Sea area simply as a “cordon sanitaire” or just a junction area for different sub-regional challenges. In this respect, Romania’s security policy aims to bring Southeastern Europe, the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Mediterranean into a common vision taking into account the existing common risks and opportunities. This intention was confirmed by President Basescu, who declared:

The next challenge is the formulation of a common Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Black Sea region. Geographically and historically, the region between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, including the South Caucasus, is inseparable from Europe...Its geo-strategic location makes the Black Sea an indispensable part of Euro-Atlantic security and prosperity. That is why it is so important that we develop the right common strategy⁸.

Since 9/11 and its accession into NATO and the European Union, Romania has clearly stated its interests but it has not evaluated whether these interests are vital, important or peripheral. It is mandatory to have clearly defined interest, ways, means, and ends. Without this our political and military engagements are valueless.

In this section, this paper will try to create a hierarchy of Romania’s interest and to establish the relationship between them, the region’s issues and regional actors. My intention is to analyze only the vital and some of the important interests of Romania. These interests are deeply rooted in the region.

Romania's vital interest is *maintaining the unity of the state, territorial integrity, and its sovereignty and independence*. In an unstable region and in a very close geographical proximity with Russia, this interest can be protected through collective defense within NATO and the European Union. Russia has no apparent intention to attack Romania's borders, but the permanent conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan prove that Russia has an interest to maintain its area of influence in the Black Sea region.

The fact that NATO's enlargement is viewed by many Romanian analysts⁹, as a political act rather than a military one, and the European Union does not have a common defense policy, there is a real reason for Romania to seek another important actor which has interests in the Black Sea area, and which can be a strategic partner. This kind of actor has to be ready to use all the means to protect its interests and to protect the countries placed in its area of interests. It has to be involved in the whole area and it has to have a strong economic, diplomatic and military presence in the Black Sea area. This actor can only be the United States.

Regarding its defense interests, Romania remains concerned primarily about unconventional threats, like terrorism and ethnic conflict, rather than a classical military aggression. In this respect Romania, through its Armed Forces, can thus become a provider of regional stability and a contributor to peace and security in Europe. New structure and equipment will assure a quick and capable reaction in case of aggression. A part of this capability has been enhanced through the United States' decision to keep a permanent presence of forces in Romania.

Romania's important interests are: *developing a dynamic, competitive and high performance market economy*. The interests' importance is determined by access to resources, foreign capital investments and military capabilities' development. Romania cannot be an economically powerful player either in its region or in the European Union without a solid and viable economic foundation. Part of this economic viability has to be assured by uninterrupted access to oil and gas resources. Following the adage that energy security is based mainly in diversity, a new quest for alternative energy resources that could alleviate some of Europe's dependence on Russia's energy is being undertaken. The wider Black Sea region plays a crucial role in this context because this is the only area in Europe's vicinity that has the potential to serve as a key producer and transit area for new sources of European gas supplies¹⁰. In this regard Romania has to be involved in developing a global resources policy in which the Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) project will be developed.

In the Black Sea and Caucasus area the owner of key global natural resources are: Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan as countries with oil reserves, and Georgia, Chechnya, Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria as transit areas for pipelines. The consumers are mainly, though not exclusively, European countries. The providers of these natural resources are security consumers in the same way that the consumers are security providers. Regional security in the Caucasus area is challenged by four frozen conflicts: Azerbaijan and Armenia's dispute over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia's separatists' attempts to gain independence from Georgia, and Transnistria's movement to separate from Moldova. Left unresolved, these conflicts remain the most significant obstacle to long term stability in the

Caucasus and Black Sea region, and have the potential to ignite into a high-intensity conflict in Europe's neighborhood¹¹. In this case it is important for a consumer or transit country to have the ability and capability to provide a permanent diplomatic and military contribution for the area's stability and security.

Russia is a special case and requires separate discussion due to its development of a special relationship with the European Union. Russia's strong political and economic relations with France and Germany and its activities in the Middle East prove that it is an important player. Romania cannot be like Germany or France but can be a bridge between Russia and the United States or NATO in the light of these new developments.

Kazakhstan's oil reserves are estimated to be around 95-117 billion barrels. Here the Russian minority remains highly problematic because this minority's presence provides Russia with a political leverage that makes Kazakhstan vulnerable to instability. The leadership effort to promote a self image of Kazakhstan as a "Eurasian bridge"¹² seems to be real, but its recent decision to ally itself with Russia as part of the so-called "Poland antimissile shield" makes its role uncertain.

Azerbaijan's oil reserves are between 5 – 11 billion barrels, and gas reserves are around 500 – 800 billion cubic meters. It boasts a well-established official nationality associated with claims of unique heritage based on an improbable blend of Turkism, Zoroastrianism, moderate Islam, and its historical function as a "bridge" between Asia and Europe along the Silk Road¹³.

Uzbekistan's oil reserves are around 527 million tons and its natural gas reserve situates it in the second place in the region. Uzbekistan is part of the Collective Security

Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Community, both organizations dominated by Russia¹⁴.

The big issue in this area is the access to pipelines. The oil can be sent to Europe in four ways: through China, (which is expensive and long), through Afghanistan and Pakistan, (which is now dangerous), through Georgia, (which is safe but with problems concerning capacities), through Turkey, (which raises issues concerning the Bosphorus), and the last through Russia, (one of the most monopolistic routes).¹⁵ The most important of these corridors is through the Caspian Sea, and here there are five countries which have access: Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran. Russia understands that its influence in this region depends upon control of this route.

Related to these corridors, the corridor's problem raises three solutions which include three blocks of interests: the first is for the Baku – Ceyhan corridor. This block is supported by the United States and Turkey, and includes Azerbaijan and Georgia. The second block is supported by Russia, with Iran and Armenia. The objective is to maintain the regional “status quo” and to prevent the United States’ access in this area. The third block is supported by the European Union and sustained by the European oil companies, and tries to protect their interests¹⁶.

As a European Union member, Romania would join the first or third pipeline alternatives, but its interest is not met by any of these two options. A possible alternative solution for Romania is a pipeline Constanta –Trieste corridor which avoids the Turkish straits. This project was included in INOGATE because 65 percent of the pipe line corridor is functional, and can be tied with Trieste through an alpine pipeline through Italia, Austria, and Germany. In this project, cooperation has already been established

with the United States which has decided to finance, through its Agency for Trade and Development (USAID), a feasibility study for the pipeline project, amounting to US \$ 300,000¹⁷.

In this case Romania has to develop its own policy which includes: a strong diplomatic effort in order to receive the United States and European Union's political support, strong development of political and economic relations with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and the graduated development of a pipeline with Serbia. Here Romania has to develop diplomatic, economic and military relationships with Serbia and to help it become a democracy.

Romania's plan concerning access to key resources was confirmed by the United States ambassador to Romania, Nicholas F. Taubman, who said:

These Southern Corridor projects could tap into underexploited resources in the Caspian Basin in countries like Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan and carry the product to Romanian and European consumers. Such alternate options make economic sense... The United States has a strong interest in helping to develop new energy sources in the region, right here. We stand ready to help¹⁸.

But this project means not only oil and gas. Romania's interests are larger. Included in this corridor, Romania will be a stable and secure country and a new place for a market economy. The investment in industry, in infrastructure and in agriculture is vital for Romania's future. Romania's participation in the "oil and gas game" involves developing a large presence of multinational companies in our economy. These global corporations can be mainly American, and their presence in Romania may be facilitated by the United States military presence in-country.

Here, Romania is interested to be part of game for a number of reasons. The first reason is based on a real world problem, i.e., "the battle" among the United States,

Russia and China, for control of strategic resources. In this “great game” are included all allies or friends, which have to be partners of this effort in the perspective of being recipients of the benefits from American presence. A second reason is that the European Union’s plans and efforts are dependent upon Russia’s resources. In this case the European Union is trying to find a safe way to control the origin and the end of the pipeline. The last reason is the protection of the resources and the pipelines. Here it is well known that the United States, NATO and European Union’s policies are based on military and diplomatic efforts to keep this area safe. In this case, if Romania develops a substantial policy it will have only benefits.

All of these issues require a common policy and a real cooperation between Euro-Atlantic communities for a new Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Black Sea region.

President Basescu emphasized, in his first visit in Washington that:

Romania is committed to become a springboard for promoting the values of freedom and democracy in the Black Sea region. In this respect, we are prepared to participate in a Black Sea Trust Fund* set up with the financial support of our American partners, USAID and the German Marshall Fund, and with EU participation, which aims to support democratic developments in our neighborhood through public-private partnerships. In addition, we will continue to initiate projects under the auspices of “Community of Democracy” to embark Georgia and other countries into the Euro-Atlantic democratic community¹⁹.

The United States’ Interests in the Black Sea – Caucasus Area and the War on Terrorism

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States’ interests in the Black Sea area span energy, military security, terrorist challenges, and the traffic in drugs, weapons, and people. Oil and gas from Central Asia and the Middle East move along Black Sea shipping lanes and pipelines to Europe and other points west. These same shipping lanes are used for the traffic in narcotics, persons (including terrorists),

conventional weapons, and components for weapons of mass destruction. The Black Sea region is an important location for military, reconstruction, and stabilization operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other possible places in Middle East, as well as for the protection of energy shipping lanes between the Caspian region and Western markets. It is also Europe's new southeastern border. Thus, both the European Union and the United States have strong interests in safeguarding the movement of some goods, preventing the movement of others, and maintaining a presence in the Black Sea region²⁰.

In this race of different runners, the United States has to be careful about the future. Not all the European Union countries agree with American unilateral policies. At the same time, in many cases, the European Union seems to be, for the United State, rather an economic partner than political one.

The United States' economic presence has to be based upon expanding bilateral trade agreements with the Black Sea states, such as the current agreements with Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine, with special emphasis on energy security and infrastructure investment in the transport of oil and gas from the Caspian region to Europe. In this case an important initiative is the German Marshall Fund of the United States, a nonpartisan American public policy and grant-making institution dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding between the United States and Europe²¹.

But the United States has to use not only economic resort because its interests are rather political and military than economic. Its interest is to protect economical investments, and at the same time to protect the corridors of trade, to assure that goods

flow freely from the United States to others and vice versa, and to create forward military base to control this area.

In his article *The Worldwide Network of US Military Bases-The Global Deployment of US Military Personnel*, Professor Jules Dufour tried to make a connection between economic interests and the establishment of the United States military bases. Dufour asserted that these bases should not be seen simply in terms of direct military ends. They are always used to promote the economic and political objectives of U.S. capitalism. For example, both the U.S. corporations and the U.S. government have been eager for some time to build a secure corridor for the U.S. - controlled oil and natural gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea in Central Asia through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea. This region has more than six percent of the world's proven oil reserves and almost forty percent of its gas reserves. The war in Afghanistan and the creation of the U.S. military bases in Central Asia are viewed as a key opportunity to make such pipelines a reality²².

We have to agree with this view and to emphasize that in the era of globalization both a nation's economies as well as emerging threats are characterized by networks. Internal and inter-regional conflicts, the al Qaeda presence, rise of failed states, poverty, and potential rogue states make the Caucasus area an unsafe one.

Establishing a military presence can be one option used to prevent new conflicts, to limit old conflicts or to keep at a distance any future threats. But when the discussion is in terms of means and ends we have to analyze the capabilities to project such a force. In this case it is important to have forces close to these potential threats.

In Europe, moving combat units based in Germany to Eastern Europe could enable the U.S. Armed Forces to respond to conflicts in the area more quickly. By comparison, basing the U.S. Army combat brigades in Poland, Bulgaria, or Romania, (locations that press articles indicate the Bush Administration is considering) would give the U.S. Army quicker access wider geographic contingencies²³.

The United States' actions are usually undertaken in accordance with its perceived vital or important interests in a problem or area. In the case of the Black Sea-Caucasus region, the vital interest is the terrorism phenomenon and its effects on America's homeland security. An important interest is protection of lines of communication because the United States wants to be sure that oil and gas markets function properly.

The strategic vision of the current U.S. administration sees terrorism as an essential threat. In the Global War on Terrorism, the United States has to be sure about "who is with us or who is against us". In the case that the European Union's countries do not ratify the new Treaty of Lisbon, signed by the European leaders on October 19, 2007, or countries like France or Germany will not agree with the United States' actions, the latter has to think, briefly, who are its allies. The Eastern European countries have to be given greater consideration in the United States' mind, because geographically they have a better strategic position in relation to the Middle East, and also politically, economically, and militarily they have strong bilateral interests in common with the United States.

One of the United States' interests in the Black Sea - Caucasus region are included in what Friedrich Ratzel wrote, in 1897, in his book *Political Geography*, and Carl Schmitt, also wrote, in his book *Land and Meer*. Both authors emphasized that

world history is the fight between maritime and land powers. They wrote that in different periods of world history *thalassocratia* (maritime power) was incarnated by the United Kingdom and the United States, and *tellurocratia* (land power) was embodied by Russia, France and Germany²⁴. Now the world is changing, but the present fight is similar with the historical one. The United States has to keep Russia in its area of interest - Asia (the land), and to develop a strong control of world waters (seas). In this case, the Black Sea is an open sea, which through the Mediterranean Sea has access to the Atlantic Ocean. That means it is vital for maintaining the freedom for international trade, but especially for flow of vital resources.

All these United States interests in the Black Sea - Caucasus area can be realized and protected through a strong cooperation with NATO's members, the NATO aspirant countries, and through a permanent economic and military presence in the region. It is well known that NATO is now involved in Afghanistan, but NATO members are not prepared to spend resources for many development or military projects. As a result NATO's mission in this country seems to be more political than military. In fact, in the Black Sea – Caucasus area, NATO and the European Union now must join their effort to support the newest democracies in Georgia and Ukraine, to support the changes in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan and to include former Yugoslavia in a special program of development along a western democratic orientation. It is the only way to prevent possible future conflicts in the region. This prevention is lower costly than a military intervention as Afghanistan or Balkans.

Specifically, the United States has to conduct military exchanges, and encourage consultations with Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, and Russia to assuage Turkey's and

Russia's concerns about losing its dominant position in the Black Sea basin to the growing influence of the United States via its construction of military bases. At the same time, the United States has to strengthen its alliance with Romania and provide military assistance in the area of emergency preparedness, and technological training of Romanian forces, and in other missions relevant to the U.S. presence there²⁵.

Capabilities, Contribution, and Benefits

Both Romania and the United States have interests in the region. The difference between them are the ways used for protection and the will of action. The common point of this relationship is the phenomenon of terrorism because both countries know that the region cannot be protected against terrorism "at home".

Romania's Participation in GWOT and the Political, Economic and Military Benefits

By supporting Romania, Washington gains a friend, a country that has historically looked to America for leadership and support, and at the time when much of the world is questioning America's goals. In the words of Joseph, F. Harrington, Romania was for the United States, "no longer a pariah, but a partner"²⁶. Now, in our opinion Romania is an ally, and has to be for the future, a friend.

In his statement on the Fifth Anniversary of 9/11, Ambassador Nicholas F. Taubman said that:

Romania is a valued partner of the U.S. in this effort. Today, more than 1,500 Romanian soldiers stand side by side with Americans and other coalition and NATO forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, bravely fighting terrorism and building democracy in those two critical countries. Four Romanian soldiers have paid the ultimate price in Afghanistan and Iraq. We Americans understand the importance of their sacrifice, just as Romanians have reminded us of the importance of standing strong against dictatorship²⁷.

These political and military engagements of Romania bring forth a lot of benefits.

Political recognition of Romania's importance for the United States was emphasized by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, on the celebration of 125 years of the United States-Romanian diplomatic relations. She emphasized that:

... The past 15 years have witnessed remarkable progress not only in the United States - Romanian relations, but in Romania's relations with the rest of the world... Romania has been a vital force in the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative. Romania's recent service on the United Nations Security Council has also been exemplary...²⁸

Economic and financial support came from the sectors in which Americans are generally interested, like banks, food and trade with non-food products. The important companies in Romania are Citibank Overseas Investment Corporation, International Finance Corporation and, Smithfield International Investments Inc²⁹. Most important for Romania was the continuity of relations with the United States and the amount of dollars that came to the country. The recognition for its efforts regarding investments and economic prosperity, and a way to motivate other companies to invest in Romania was the awarding of the United States Trade and Development Country of the Year Award. United States Trade and Development Agency (USTADA) has been active in Romania since 1992 and has funded 67 early project-planning activities in that country totaling \$16.7 million³⁰.

Not only American companies' investments were important for Romania, but also the United States government's financial support for administrative and military reforms was also important. In this case the United States' investments in Romania in FY 2006 were around \$43.55 million³¹. This money was shared to cover Anti-Terrorism Assistance, Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education & Training,

International Information Programs, Public Diplomacy Exchanges, and Feasibility Studies & Trade Promotion. In this way the United States has supported Romania's government in democratization, in passing crucial reforms, and in transition reform. These reforms made Romania more competitive in its contribution to GWOT, diplomacy and economical development.

Militarily, Romania's benefits are included in the basis of the current reform process of the Romanian Armed Forces. More than 300 Romanian officers attended courses in the United States in the last eight years through the International Military Education and Training program, thus creating a real basis for "integration through education". One of the most important United States efforts was to advise, and support the Romanian Ministry of Defense in the Armed Forces' transformation process. "The Romania Defense Assessment and Action Plan" represented the framework and strategy for all the activities that have to be done in two phases: 2000-2005- Force Planning Restructuring and 2005-2015- Force Re-Capitalization Procurement Plan³². Its execution has created, for the Romanian Armed Forces the opportunity to be credible as a NATO interoperable force.

Romania's Military Capabilities to Participate in GWOT

The Romanian Armed Forces have passed the first three phases of reform and are now in the fourth phase: equipment acquisition. To be credible, the Armed Forces must become interoperable with NATO's Armed Forces and have smaller, mobile, efficient and modern structures. By continuing current strategic, multilateral and bilateral partnerships and by developing some others, it can create favorable conditions to strengthen security in the region.

In 2007 Romania's Armed Forces currently have around 1,700 military personnel committed abroad, primarily in Afghanistan, Iraq and the western Balkans. The development of their doctrine, plans, and procurement are uniformly geared to integration with NATO structures³³.

In 2008 Romanian Army will provide two brigades to NATO - one mechanized and one mountain. In 2015, Romania is committed to have one mechanized division fully operational. These units have or will have C² capabilities, wheeled armored personnel carrier vehicles, armed and unarmed patrol vehicles, 155mm self-propelled howitzers, and self propelled anti-aircraft systems.

The Romanian Air Force is now engaged in an air policing mission in the Baltic countries. Airmen are also involved in missions in the Balkans and Afghanistan. The lack of equipment represents a significant issue for future missions but this has been partially solved. The upgrade of the MIG-21 Lancer aircraft, and IAR-330 PUMA SOCAT assault helicopter made the Romanian Air Forces compatible with NATO members. Romania's future financial effort will be focused on the upgrade of the MIG-29, in the acquisition of the new multi role aircraft, medium lift aircraft, and short range missiles.

The Romanian Navy has three frigates involved in Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean Sea. One of these, *Marasesti*, was made in Romania and two of them, *Queen Mary* and *King Ferdinand*, have been bought from the United Kingdom. The Navy effort is focused on making them useful for NATO missions especially for Search and Rescue missions. Another priority for the future is the reequipping of the submarine *Dolphin*, a Kilo class electric boat.

The Romanian Special Operations Command was created on October 14, 2005, and represents the fourth major branch of the Romanian Armed Forces. The personnel will have its own logistics and support capabilities. The structures are modeled after the U.S. Army Special Forces, commonly known as the Green Berets. Several Romanian soldiers have attended and successfully graduated from the U.S. Army SF selection process in its entirety, and they, together with several Special Forces advisors, are now conducting a selection process in Romania to increase the number of members for that service³⁴.

Intelligence represents the primary effort the Romanian armed forces. In the GWOT in Afghanistan and Iraq the most visible service is that of intelligence. This structure was created in early 2000's. It was originally stated that they belong to the light infantry battalions which were currently deployed there. This unit is used for strategic purposes, compared to other scouting units which are used at a tactical level during conflicts. A detachment has been deployed and rotated in Iraq since 2003. The HUMINT battalion continues to be subordinated to the general directorate of military intelligence.

These structure and their future equipments are certainly proof that Romania's Armed forces are able to be a real partner in the war against terrorism.

Advantages for the United States Military Presence in Romania for Future Missions

For the United States the advantages of forward deployed forces based in Romania are: these places assure one of the best configurations for a mobile forward deployed global posture in the World; the geographical location presents the best opportunity to meet the world's challenges; they increase the United States' relevance

in relation with the European Union, Russia, China, India and, at the same time, with rogue states; assure a rapid and common cooperation with Russia, in the war against terrorism; prevent actions' duplication of effort, discrimination and decompression in the support for the European Union's security; and the facilities need small financial investments and short time to be made operational. Finally, another benefit is training for units. It is generally known that Germany has problems with fire range areas and its law constrains many military training activities. At the same time, to train a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) in conditions of classic conflict demands a real Opposing Force (OPFOR). Such a force demands money and personnel. Romania can fill both requirements.

For Romania, the advantage of the American presence lies in the increase of foreign economic and financial investments and the increase of United States, European Union and Black Sea neighbor's cooperation as well as the amplification of intercultural exchanges.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The United States and its NATO allies face a new strategic environment, particularly along Europe's eastern periphery. They need to develop new methods and procedures for responding to it. The enemies are flexible, nimble and innovative, but governments are, in contrast laboriously slow, wedded to established methods, and restricted by standard operational procedures. Unless the NATO member states are able to transcend these limitations to respond to disorder in systematic and innovative ways, the forces of disorder will emerge triumphant and the Westphalia system will suffer³⁵.

Romania has to use its post - 1989 experience as a transitional democracy to be the best of America's advisors in Iraq and Afghanistan's reconstruction. It is well known that after the December 1989 revolution that Romania was in a situation similar to that of Iraq. The process of de-communization, the process of democracy's development and the problem of building a market economy all bear similarities to that of Iraq.

Romania has to develop a set of strategic, operational and tactical initiatives to meet its expectation in relation with the United States.

In the new strategic environment, Romania has to take benefits from Germany's and Italy's³⁶ political hesitation related to United States military presence in their countries. It also can use, to its benefits, the tension between NATO and European Union over the development of the European Security and Defense Policy. These tensions may make the United States think more seriously about an extension of forward bases in Romania. The political commitment and the facilities that Romania can provide for these American military bases can determine the United States to increase the economic and military investments in Romania.

At the military operational level, Romania has to plan its new engagement in the war against terrorism through developing military's capabilities. The first element has to be acquisition of the systems for a fully operational division to fulfill future missions. This division has to be the main instrument that Romania will use to support its political and military engagements. This can be use to create a Romanian task force for actual and future missions in GWOT. The Division headquarter can be deployed to lead a mission for one year, and the brigades can be rotated for as long a time as needed. The only change that will be required is to increase the current deployment period from six

months to a year. In this case Romania has to negotiate with the United States the economic benefits, such as Romanian companies' participation in the region's reconstruction, the United States economic investments in Romania, or political support in regional project development.

At the tactical level, for the moment, the effort has to be focused in creating Romanian task forces for stability and reconstruction operation in Iraq or Afghanistan. This idea is based on two arguments. First was my affirmation in 2005, in an article in the journal *Romanian Military Thinking*, in which I emphasized that the only way for Romania's presence in Afghanistan is an independent area of responsibility in which will act all Romanian forces³⁷. A second reason is that the Ministry of Defense's decision is to create, in 2008, in Zabul province of Afghanistan a Romanian task force which will include a maneuver battalion, special forces, a HUMINT structure, and a training and logistical structure³⁸. This new attitude will change the Romanian Armed Forces image and will be a significant determinant in the recognition of their combat capabilities. At the same time, more responsibilities means more experience, and more experience means thrust, recognition and the courage to be engaged in most difficult operations.

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